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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

To JusTiFY
on Legal Ethics

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-SuFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
ANNULMENT OF ATroRNEx's LIcENSE.-Committee

of the West Virginia State Bar instituted proceedings in the circuit
court of Hancock County for the purpose of annulling D's license
to practice law in West Virginia on grounds of fraud in dealings
with a client. Client employed D on contingent basis to prosecute a
personal injury action, which D settled out of court. Client contends
that D's fee was to be one-third of the recovery, that D falsely represented to him that to enable D to obtain a substantial settlement
of the claim it would be necessary to pay a bribe to the insurance
company's attorney, and that in supposed furtherance of the bribery
scheme D induced client to indorse to him a check which was kept
by D for himself. D contends that he was to receive one-half of the
recovery, that he did not mention a bribe to client, and that he was
legally entitled to the amount of the check, it representing the difference between one-third of the recovery and one-half of the recovery. In two prior felony cases against D on substantially the
same set of facts, D was convicted by jury verdict of larceny, although both convictions were set aside on technical grounds. The
circuit court ordered D's license annulled. On writ of error to the
Supreme Qourt of Appeals, held, that to annul an attorney's license
to practice law the misconduct must be shown by full, clear and
preponderating evidence, and that the evidence against D does not
meet this test. Judgment reversed. Committee on Legal Ethics v.
Pietranton,95 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1956).
This case points out the high degree of proof required in a
disbarment proceeding to convince the West Virginia court that it is
full, clear and preponderating. Although the juries in the felony
cases found the evidence convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, the
court in the principal case felt that the evidence was not even full,
clear and preponderating, a less stern test. In a convincing dissent
Judge Lovins agreed with the test to be applied, but expressed the
view that the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to meet
the test. See Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703, 1915D
L.R.A. 1218 (1912). For a collection of cases and pertinent discussions, see 5 AM. Jitr. § 295 (1936); Annot., 7 A.L.R. 93 (1920);
Note, 40 L.R.A. (N.s.) 801 (1912).
G. W. H., Jr.
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
BASTAIRDS-WOMAN UNWED AT BmTH OF CHILD BUT WED AT
TimE OF BRINGING AcTnoN.-P, unwed mother, subsequently married
a man other than the father of the child. After her marriage, but
within three years of the birth of the child, P caused a warrant to be
issued for the arrest of D, the alleged father of the child, under
W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 7, § 1 (Michie 1955). After preliminary
proceedings the warrant was quashed upon retrial as insufficient in
law, the grounds being that P was at the time of the issuance of the

warrant a married woman and there was no showing that she had
not lived or cohabited with her husband for at least one year prior
to the birth of the child as required by the statute in the case of a
married woman. The State's application to the circuit court for a
writ of error was denied. Upon petition of State the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia granted writ of error. Held, the Code
provision that an unmarried woman may accuse any person of being
the father of a child of which she is delivered relates to her marital
status at the time of the birth of the child, and not at the time when
she makes the accusation. Judgment reversed and case remanded.
State v. Mercer, 92 S.E.2d 745 (W. Va. 1956).
The reasoning behind the court's decision is that the main
purpose of a bastardy proceeding is to prevent an illegitimate child
from becoming a public burden, which it well might become if
born while the mother is unwed, even though she later marries.
This is the generally accepted construction of this type of statute.
For full discussion and collection of cases, see Annot., 14 A.L.R. 974
(1921).
G. W. H., Jr.
a Vinculo Matrimonii FOR DESERTION SUBa Mensa et Thoro.-D, wife, was granted divorce a mensa et thoro from P in 1933. D allegedly did not exercise
the rights thus conferred upon her, but resumed normal marital
relations with P and lived with him as his wife until 1944 when she
deserted P. D contends that since the prior decree a mensa et thoro
has not been revoked by the court as provided by W. VA. CODE
c. 48, art. 2, § 16 (1931), as amended by W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 85, D
is justified in leaving and P is precluded from seeking divorce a
vinculo matrimonii on grounds of desertion. The circuit court of
Wood County dismissed P's bill of complaint. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, held, that while the
DIVORCE-DECREE

SEQUENT TO DEcREE
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Code provides for revocation by court action of decree a mensa et
thoro, such procedure is not exclusive; and if the two parties become
reconciled and live together as man and wife, the offended spouse
in the mensa et thoro suit waives his or her right to live separate and
apart from the other spouse and can thereafter be guilty of desertion.
Judgment reversed. Scott v. Scott, 91 S.E.2d 621 (W. Va. 1956).
The court's holding that the statute providing for a court decree
to dissolve a prior decree a mensa et thoro does not mean this is the
exclusive method by which to terminate a separation decree is certainly contra to the construction that most courts have made of
similar statutes. In most jurisdictions the courts have held that a
court decree is the only way to terminate a decree of separation,
although it is generally held that a mere separation agreement can
be terminated by reconciliation and cohabitation. Annot., 40 A.L.R.
1227 (1926), 85 A.L.R. 420 (1933), 35 A.L.R.2d 707 (1954).
G. W. H., Jr.

DIVORCE-DivismxE DIVORCE

PROCEEDINGs-AwARD oF ALiMONY

WiTHoUT PESoNAL JUBIsDIcTIoN.-D, husband, filed suit for divorce in New Hampshire to which P, wife, filed cross-petition for
separate maintenance. D herein subsequently applied for and was
granted ex parte divorce in Nevada with an alimony award to the
wife of $50.00 per month. Subsequently, the New Hampshire court
ordered D herein to pay P herein $250.00 per month for separate
maintenance. P sues for separate maintenance arrears owed P by D
under the New Hampshire decree. Held, that the award of alimony
by the Nevada court was void, because of lack of personal jurisdiction over P and not, therefore, entitled to full faith and credit;
but that the New Hampshire court gained personal jurisdiction over
D by reason of his filing there for divorce and its award of separate
maintenance payments is binding on D and entitled to full faith and
credit, even though the Nevada decree had previously granted a
valid ex parte divorce. Dorney v. Dorney, 145 F. Supp. 281 (S. D.
W. Va. 1956).
This case presents a good picture of the operation of the
doctrine of divisible divorce. The subject is fully treated in
59 W. VA. L. REv. 193 (1956).
G. W. H., Jr.
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